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"Like an Ox Yoke": Challenging the Intrinsic Virtuosity 
of a Grassroots Social Movement 
Abstract 
Since the 1980s, neoliberal globalization fostered an upsurge of grassroots social movements in 
Latin America that sought alternatives to increasing poverty and social exclusion. Social 
movement scholars often interpret these movements as morally noble models of democracy 
given their claims to social justice and equity. My research examines the forced seizure of a 
closed Mexican sugar mill and establishment of a cooperative, worker-run factory by a 
grassroots movement whose cultural politics aimed at creating more democratic processes. Yet 
in 2009, after 11 years of success, movement leaders declared the mill bankrupt and shut it 
down. The façade of unity presented by activists obscured internal divisions and hierarchical 
control that beleaguered the movement. I argue that a more nuanced and critical analysis that 
takes into consideration the contradictions and paradoxes that may be present in grassroots 
struggles reframes essentialist conceptions regarding the intrinsic virtuosity of grassroots social 
movements. 
  




 Massive debt in the 1980s and IMF-mandated structural adjustment prompted many Latin 
American governments to adopt neoliberal policies (Gates, 1996; Gustafson, 1994; Otero 1996). 
These policies included privatizations, market liberalization, retraction of the state’s role in the 
economy, and elimination of social guarantees of the welfare state. This new embracing of the 
neoliberal paradigm represented a political-ideological decision to rebuild the political economy 
to serve the interests of emergent coalitions of capital. In 1982, Mexico had 1155 state 
enterprises; 52 of these were sugar mills. By 1992, 886 state enterprises were privatized, 
including 50 sugar mills. During the Salinas de Gortari administration (1988-2004), seven of the 
privatized mills closed their doors.  
Carton de Grammont (1995), Gledhill (2005), and Phillips (1998) provide evidence that 
neoliberal globalization contributed to increased economic marginalization across the region, 
while Edelman (1999) and Rubio (1996) document an upsurge of social movements that sought 
alternatives to the neoliberal model. Gledhill (1995) examines the marginalization that these 
processes left in their wake in the state of Michoacán, Mexico—the region of my research. 
Harvey (2003) refers to privatization of state enterprises as “accumulation by dispossession,” 
whereby important public resources pass to the hands of private capital. Medeiros (2009) refers 
to this process in Latin America as a “privatization stampede.” He convincingly argues that it 
was less the debt crisis than the emergence of a new coalition of domestic private capitalists who 
pushed for privatizations. This new financier class used its enriched assets to launch an 
“accumulation through encroachment” on state assets (2009: 126). ’In 1993, presidential 
candidate Salinas de Gortari called 27 of Mexico’s wealthiest industrialists to a dinner; each of 
these was asked to donate $25 million to his election campaign. Many of these were recipients of 
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state enterprises at bargain-basement prices. In Mexico’s sugar industry, all investors were 
domestic capitalists. 
One of these, Mexican industrialist Alberto Santos de Hoyos purchased four sugar mills 
in 1991, then closed the Puruarán, Michoacán mill in 1992 to consolidate production at his 
Pedernales refinery, 10 kilometers to the north of Puruarán. Santos claimed the Puruarán mill 
was unprofitable, thus placing individual profit above social good. He selected Puruarán for 
closure because workers at the Pedernales syndicate agreed to partial layoffs; those at Puruarán 
demanded, “If you are going to hang one of us, hang us all.” Their commitment to social justice, 
in effect, sealed their fate. Even members of the workers’ syndicate blamed their own leaders for 
this statement. 
 Campesinos (small-scale farmers) often consider themselves perpetually subjugated and 
in debt, yet their struggles for liberation seldom extract them from oppression. Indeed, a social 
movement composed of diverse sectors emerged in Mexico in 1993 to protest the debtors’ crisis. 
Calling themselves “El Barzón” (barzón is the yoke ring for hitching a plow to a team of oxen), 
the movement protested massive debts owed and their continued economic oppression under the 
neoliberal paradigm.1  The question this research raises is whether the formation of an alternative 
social movement in Puruarán, Michoacán facilitated liberation from the previous “yoke” of the 
privatized sugar mill.  
Privatization of the Mexican sugar industry promised to modernize the sector with new 
capital as the state withdrew to focus on IMF-imposed structural adjustment and debt repayment. 
Contrary to expectations, rising interest rates and decapitalization left new mill owners unable to 
pay off loans for the purchase of mills. By August, 2000, industrialists at twenty sugar mills had 
 5 
not paid the $14 billion dollars owed to cañeros (cane growers) for their sugar cane and called on 
the government for a bailout (Muñoz, 2000a, 2000b).  
 Debt was not the only obstacle that sugar industrialists faced. Initially supportive of 
NAFTA, they looked forward to opening of the U.S. market to Mexican cane sugar. “Free trade,” 
however, proved elusive. After 1994, the U.S. exported high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) to 
Mexico while it limited imports of Mexican cane sugar—in non-compliance with NAFTA. From 
1996-2002, the U.S. exported an average of 180,000 tons of HFCS per year to Mexico (USDA, 
2004). Years of World Trade Organization disputes between the two countries ensued. 
Privatization, debt, and market competition contributed to corporate consolidation and the 
closure of seven Mexican sugar mills and created unprecedented economic crisis in sugar-
producing communities.  
 Edelman and Haugerud (2005) insightfully argue that transitions in the global economy 
coincided with post-modernist anthropology, rejection of master narratives, and constriction of 
intellectual debate regarding people’s resistance to mounting inequality. New social movements 
(NSMs) theory distinguished NSMs from “old” movements that primarily involved class 
struggles or sought revolutionary upheaval. Foweraker (1995), Laclau and Mouffe (1985), and 
Melucci (1989) inform that NSMs no longer engage in traditional conflicts with the state or 
class-based politics, but rather involve cultural struggles over democracy, autonomy, cultural 
meanings, and the formation of new social identities. While Escobar (2005) situates the 
distinctiveness of NSMs in identity politics and privileges discourse, Edelman (1999) rejects 
NSMs theorists’ ahistorical, post-modern emphasis on identity and discourse and their dismissal 
of a political economy analysis of structural inequalities. Gledhill’s (1988) incisive historical 
critique of religious and indigenous movements in Michoacán demonstrates that consciousness, 
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discursive frames, and political resistance have always been, and continue to be, considerably 
more complex than NSM theorists suggest. Hellman (1995) argues that NSMs are indeed not 
“new” but reveal the failure of NSMs theorists to recognize that paradoxical contradictions and 
cultural politics were always present in “old” social movements or that NSMs may also involve 
class struggles or challenges to the state.  
Several examples illustrate a common interpretation of these movements as morally 
noble: Issa’s (2008) analysis of the landless workers’ movement in Brazil, Olesen’s (2006) 
research on the Zapatista movement in Mexico, examination of indigenous struggles illustrated 
by Albro’s (2005) publication on the water wars in Bolivia, and the closed factory takeovers in 
Argentina reported by Sitrin (2006). The social movement literature garners much scholarly 
interest in grassroots struggles for democratization, social justice, and cultural preservation. 
Scholars enamored with struggles for democratization and social justice often present an overly-
optimistic view of contemporary social movements. Indeed, Hellman’s skepticism leads her to 
claim these movements as “irresistibly attractive” to scholars (2008: 61). White nationalist, 
supremacist hate groups such as neo-Nazis, skinheads, and resurgence of the KKK could be 
defined as NSMs, but their intolerant aims also eluded the attention of NSM theorists. Few 
researchers examine the significance of social movements whose practices contradict their 
collective values and goals. I argue that a more critical perspective is in order.  
Over the past two decades, however, a number of anthropologists returned to questions of 
political economy to document social exclusion, which Rubio (2006) identifies as the defining 
characteristic of globalization. More critical, context-embedded analyses of social movements 
challenge essentialist assumptions that grassroots movements are inherently more democratic, 
that they empower activists through participation, or that they purge their organizations of 
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hierarchical relationships. Paoli and da Silva Telles (1998) deconstruct interpretations that 
presume the intrinsic virtuosity of social movements through analyses that reveal the 
disorderliness of internal tensions and contradictions.  
Several examples point to the relevance of reconceptualizing social movement practice. 
Ivancheva (2010) examines how the Bolivarian University of Venezuela, founded on principles 
of resistance to global capitalism, anti-authoritarianism, solidarity, and radical reform reveals the 
paradox of internal critique and reproduction of traditional hierarchical structures as student 
radicalism became unacceptable to the socialist intellectuals who founded the university. 
Schuller’s (2010) work with grassroots organizing in Haiti further illustrates the necessity of a 
more nuanced analysis that takes into account how NGO partners effectively put local groups 
into conflict with each other and create local turf battles as international actors compete for their 
loyalty. Rubin (1998) found that the Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and Students of the Isthmus 
(COCEI) of Oaxaca, Mexico, in its struggle for local political control, moved from domination to 
democratization, yet the social movement came to represent a political culture characterized by 
ambiguity and contradiction that fell short of internal coherency. Likewise, Storey’s (2010) 
ethnographic research on witnessing in the West Bank challenges interpretations of anti-
globalization movements as less hierarchical, decentralized networks that empower participants. 
Edelman (1999) documents that in Costa Rica, conflicts over political vision and finances 
weakened the movement, thus “grassroots” does not always equate with democratization. 
Hellman (2008), drawing on her research of union organizations in Mexico, cautions social 
movement scholars that even as social movements challenge domination, they may reproduce 
existing clientelist systems led by caciques (local bosses). Bryer’s (2010) ethnographic research 
examines worker-recuperated factories in Argentina and challenges researchers who presume 
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internal solidarity of cooperative organizations. Prompted by the crisis of neoliberalism and a 
rash of factory closings, workers appropriated abandoned businesses and established cooperative 
management systems with shared decision making. However, the outcome was internal 
dissention between those who aspired to profit-oriented management and accounting systems 
and those who prioritized social good over material ends. Thus, it may be erroneous to assume 
that cooperatives enable a new form of more democratic social relations. 
 Stahler-Sholk et al. raise a significant issue regarding social movements: “An important 
question to consider is whether contemporary social movements are necessarily more internally 
democratic or progressive than other forms of organizing and whether they necessarily lead to 
higher levels of empowerment” (2008: 7). Hellman (2008) leaves social movement scholars with 
an important unfinished task, since we understand little about how the democratization process 
takes place or why it may fail to materialize.  
In challenging the intrinsic virtuosity of social movements, I take cultural politics as a 
dialectic process wherein cultural meanings condition activities and activities reshape cultural 
understandings, but always, as Dagnino (1998), Roseberry (1989), and Slater (1998) assert, 
within a context of unequal access to power. Warren (1998) envisions cultural politics as a 
cultural practice embedded in materialist praxis just as materialist praxis is infused in cultural 
meanings. Yet, as Alvarez et al. (1998) contend, insufficient attention has been given to the 
cultural politics of social movements: “…investigating the relationship between neoliberal 
renditions of citizenship, social adjustments, and the cultural politics of social movements is an 
especially urgent task” (1998: 23). Cultural politics reveals insights into how people enact 
practices and subjectivities as they make culturally-defined claims. This requires, as Melucci 
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(1989) and Slater (1998) contend, a more nuanced understanding of the internal dynamics and 
submerged networks of daily life within these movements. 
 My analysis of the social movement in Puruarán, Michoacán, where privatization and 
free trade led to the closure of a regional sugar mill and left many in the community unemployed, 
provides a lens into the contradictions and paradoxes that may be present in grassroots 
movements. Community members seized the closed sugar mill and put it into operation as a 
worker-run cooperative from 1998-2009 (Chollett, 1999, 2000, 2003). The “success” of this 
social movement in rejuvenating the local economy came undone in 2009, when the 
administrative council declared the factory bankrupt and shut it down, again leaving the town 
without its main source of income. I analyze a social movement that emerged in the process of 
contested negotiations between hegemonic actors, whose hegemony was limited by local 
strategies of confrontation, and the formation of a cooperative, whose members divided into 
opposing factions, even as they united in a common effort to reopen the community’s sugar mill. 
Contending factions are part and parcel of the social movement process, yet these did not 
dampen the common goal of the movement. Despite their internal power struggles, social 
movements provide political arenas for making collective demands. I accord attention, as 
Roseberry (1989) and Slater (1998) suggest, to the fissures in capitalist hegemony, internal 
heterogeneity within marginalized localities, and the dialectical intersection of geopolitics and 
social movements. As Edelman asserts: “…the politics of economic structural adjustment… is 
better understood as a complex and eminently cultural process of political and ideological 
contention within and between policymaking dominant groups and popular sectors” (1999: 40). 
Cañeros and mill workers in Puruarán trace back a long genealogy of family members 
who labored for the hacienda, in the sugar refinery, and in the cane fields. Of symbolic 
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importance is the plaque commemorating a 1966 presidential decree, when the government 
rehabilitated the ingenio (sugar mill) and declared the factory, “Ingenio Ejidal Puruarán,” to be 
given for the benefit of the community. This plaque provided the basis for the community’s 
challenge to privatization and justification for taking over the mill following its closure. A social 
movement participant explained: 
Well, I see the sale as a great fraud because the mill wasn't even property of the federal 
government. It has always been considered as the patrimony of the town. At that moment 
the mill was ripped from the hands of the people. 
As in the case of factory seizures in Argentina (Klein and Lewis, 2004), this cultural 
construction confers ownership of the mill on the community, symbolizes the illegitimacy of its 
sale to Santos, and asserts the community’s moral right to their source of work in the name of 
social justice. Not unlike struggles against mining in Ecuador (Kuecker, 2008), theirs was a 
radical ideology that placed community and the welfare of future generations above corporate 
profits. The mill directly supported 3,854 cañeros and workers, yet indirectly benefitted the 
community and surrounding region. Deprived of the community’s primary source of employment, 
poverty, hunger, business failures, and escalating violence became manifest (Chollett, 2000).  
Angel Guzmán and the Illegal Harvest 
 Angel Guzmán (pseudonym), president of the local cane growers’ union, emerged as 
leader of the social movement. A crowd of 1,000 united in November, 1992 to demand 
reopening of the Puruarán mill. With no positive response, in May, 1993, they seized the factory, 
repaired it, and prepared to process 36,000 tons of cane during the “minizafra” (the local term for 
the illegal harvest). With profits from production of 3,300 tons of sugar, Guzmán made partial 
payments to cañeros and workers. The minizafra thus inverted the state’s and mill owner’s 
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objectives, utilizing the illegal seizure to subvert regional development schemes in the name of 
social justice and autonomy (Chollett, 2003).  
The state governor, in support of Santos, used the power of the police to suppress the 
movement. Judicial police arrested seven leaders of the movement and Santos’ personnel began 
to remove equipment from the mill to prevent operation of the refinery. The police entered and 
guarded the mill from 1993-1996. Meanwhile, the social movement continued to demand 
reopening or expropriation of the mill for the common good. Activists seized the Legislative 
Palace in the state capital of Morelia and set up an encampment of tents along the street facing 
the palace.  
 Complex and contradictory processes were at work in this movement as grassroots 
participants demonstrated unity in their goal to reopen the mill. Political differences, however, 
threatened this unity as struggle for control of leadership of the movement emerged. As the 
minizafra got underway, a public assembly voted to depose Martín Rodríguez (pseudonym), then 
president of the ejido (landholding unit). Many blamed him for obligating cañeros to deliver their 
cane to Pedernales (Méndez Estrada, 1993; Robles Soto, 1993). Not only would this require extra 
time and travel costs to deliver cane to a zone they did not identify with, but he was viewed as a 
traitor to the cause for failure to support the Puruarán mill. The contentious relationship between 
Angel Guzmán and Martín Rodríguez marked the apogee of factionalism within the social 
movement as Guzmán and Rodríguez led separate factions to negotiate with Santos for the 
community’s purchase of the Puruarán mill. Those who supported Guzmán praised him for 
challenging Santos, carrying out the minizafra, and restoring their source of work. Others blamed 
him for robbing cañeros of funds paid for social security and for non-payment of workers’ wages 
and thus aligned with Rodríguez. Opponents of Rodríguez asserted that he personally profited from 
 12 
the sale of timber on ejido lands and for his partiality to Ingenio Pedernales. Both leaders engaged in 
clientelist practices by claiming to be the one with capacity to negotiate for the sale of the Puruarán 
mill to the community. Leadership was thus reinforced by a degree of Machiavellianism with 
promises to restore economic viability to the community. Fracturing of the movement revealed the 
underlying tensions and dynamics of shifting alliances that Slater (1998) informs often punctuate 
larger forces for unity.  
Ultimately, the sale failed to materialize and other challenges to the movement emerged. 
Timoteo Lianza (pseudonym), a leader who was jailed after the mill seizure, turned against Angel 
Guzmán, openly exposing him for usurpation of funds. A letter he authored to President Ernesto 
Zedillo demanded action against the “pseudo leader” for “taking advantage of the ignorance, the 
hunger and the needs of this town that was buried in the greatest misery and poverty in memory…” 
concluding, “…it is better to die reclaiming what legitimately and by rights belongs to us, than to 
die of hunger under the cacique dictatorship of Angel.”2  Martín Rodríguez was assassinated after 
completing his term as ejido president. After two attempts on his life, in 1996 Angel Guzmán left 
Puruarán; shortly after, he was felled by five bullets.  
The Priest’s Mediation 
Local power struggles and fear-instilling violence clarified the need for a mediating 
influence in Puruarán. In 1995, the community priest, Jesús DíazBarriga, agreed to lead the social 
movement. He recalled, “Since the beginning I said let's fight, not by violent means, but by legal 
means, in a civilized manner.”  Nonetheless, members of the newly formed Committee for the 
Struggle to Reopen Ingenio Puruarán determined that they would once again seize the mill. The 
government then handed it over in custody to the committee.   
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The state government responded to the crisis of unemployment by proposing 15 micro-
enterprises, including a gas station, a fertilizer bag factory, and a factory to manufacture clothing. 
As explained by DíazBarriga: 
We cannot sacrifice the people who need work to sustain their families, when we continue 
to run up against a wall with the attempt to reopen the sugar mill. Seeing that reopening it is 
almost impossible with globalization of the economy, that now with the high fructose the 
sugar is failing, we have to accept other businesses to give other types of work. 
 Much criticism was directed toward the committee for abandoning the sugar mill in order 
to focus on alternative employment projects. Some accused the priest’s committee of being 
“sold” to the government. The growing strength of oppositional political parties in Mexico also 
played a role in social movement dynamics. Those affiliated with the priest’s committee were 
known as “PRI-istas,” and their opponents as “PRD-istas.”3  The PRD had supported the social 
movement, whereas the PRI mostly had not. Factionalism sharpened as officers of the priest’s 
committee ran for municipal offices on the PRI ticket and won. Dissidents complained of how 
these committee members used the movement to gain political offices. An oppositional faction 
coalesced around Juan Soto (pseudonym) who led the new opposition.  
Juan Soto’s Uncooperative Cooperative 
As members of the priest’s committee guarded the mill in 1998, the Soto faction forced 
its guards out of the mill and took it over. The influence of the PRD in the Soto faction 
crystallized with the involvement of key PRD representatives in promoting the organization of a 
cooperative. Members elected Soto president of the Cooperative Society of Workers of Ingenio 
Puruarán; its purpose, Soto explained, was to “defend ourselves against the voracity of 
capitalism.”  His words would prove to ring hollow in years to come.  
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In 1998, after five years of abandonment, the Puruarán sugar mill belched forth black 
columns of smoke and resumed operation. But the results of the 1998 harvest were dismal since 
workers were able to produce only 20 tons of sugar. Soto justified these poor results with the 
argument that the 1998 season was merely a test and that enemies had sabotaged the mill.  
Accusations fed paranoia, creating a very uncooperative environment. Fractioning of the social 
movement peaked at this time, dividing the town with suspicions and mistrust.  
 At Pedernales, numerous production and harvest charges, as well as high interest rates 
reduced cañeros’ profits. In 1998, 1466 cañeros from Puruarán delivered cane, valued at 
$19,179,073 pesos, to Pedernales. Of these, 63.7 percent earned profits. However, 36 percent 
were left in debt to Ingenio Pedernales at the end of the harvest.  In contrast, cañeros who 
delivered to received interest-free loans and avoided the multitude of charges deducted at 
Pedernales. Competition with HFCS caused 60 percent of Pedernales’ sugar to be left in the 
warehouse and the mill lacked cash flow to make final payments to cañeros.  
From 1999-2006, the Puruarán sugar mill increased production and cañeros increased 
their earnings. Much of the success of the Puruarán cooperative derived from a relationship it 
forged with the Cooperative Society of Workers of Pascual. This cooperative produces natural 
fruit drinks using only cane sugar. Pascual provided cash advances for operation of the Puruarán 
sugar mill and purchased all of its sugar production, thus the Puruarán mill enjoyed a guaranteed 
market and freedom from competition with HFCS.  
Despite this progress, opposition to the cooperative administration persisted. By 1999, yet 
another faction formed to obtain credit for cañeros. Their intent was to circumvent the 
cooperative and provide credit directly to cañeros via a government trust fund. As one member 
asserted, “The money will not pass through Soto’s hands. The cooperative has to disappear.” 
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Pedro expressed his dissatisfaction: “The cane is ours, but it isn’t for us—it is for the bunch of 
rats. They don’t give information. The cooperative committee has one harnessed—like an ox 
yoke.” Complaints concerning lack of information on the mill’s financial status, absence of 
meetings, and suspicions of fraud mounted. Following the 2008 and 2009 harvests, the 
administration made no payments to cañeros who delivered their cane and cañeros demanded an 
audit, upon which, Soto left Puruarán. In early November, 2009, the administration declared the 
mill bankrupt and claimed it would cease processing cane in the zone, again leaving the 
community without its main source of employment. 
Challenging Intrinsic Virtuosity 
Given the historical relationship between cañeros and mill owners, analysis should detect a 
clear distinction between the operation of a sugar mill based on capitalist profit making and one that 
functions as a cooperative with social ends. The former is recognized for contentious, hierarchical 
relationships between mill management and cañeros: 
During centuries, historically, the cañero had the idea that the industrialist wanted to pay 
him [sic] less. In the historical struggle between cañeros and sugar mills, the cañero never 
said, ‘They pay me fairly.’  We are brothers, but we are always brothers that they want to 
screw. Historically, the cañeros have been exploited (interview with Pascual Alvarado, 
Local Union Coordinador, Nation Union of Sugarcane Producers, 1997). 
 In an assembly held by the cooperative in 2000, a cooperative organizer spoke of the 
advantages of cooperative organization: 
We are already beginning to see the benefits. In the cooperative, since we are the owners, 
we do not have the costs like at Ingenio Pedernales. This is the great advantage. It is 
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difficult because we are in an environment of capitalism. But here in the cooperative we 
all put on our pants or none of us do. This is a cooperative—not capitalism. 
Theoretically, the cooperative sugar mill represents an alternative to Santos’ Pedernales 
refinery; the former involved a community that appropriated power from the grassroots to wrest 
the mill from the hands of an investment strategy based on private initiative, productive 
efficiency, and capital accumulation. In essence, those in the cooperative demanded economic 
and political autonomy from standard neoliberal practice. Cañeros claimed resources formerly 
denied to them when subordinated to traditional mill management, and as such, asserted their 
unique place in a social field where they had previously been marginalized. Bryer’s (2010) 
insight into the dialectical relationship between meaningful labor and the requisites for 
accountability and profitability emphasizes the need to take into account the contradictions and 
paradoxes of social movement praxis. Other scholars such as Hellman (2008) and Rubin (1998) 
challenge the assumption that social movement praxis is internally coherent and reveal that 
hierarchy often trumps the stated democratizing efforts of social movements. 
Cañeros at Puruarán premised their cooperative on serving the broader social good and 
thus rejected traditional management’s quest for profit at the expense of cañeros. However, the 
management council of the newly-formed cooperative replicated traditional vertical relations, 
closed off transparency in the handling of finances, and outright fraud overwhelmed demands for 
transparency, democracy, and shared decision making. During interviews, I detected a strong 
consensus that the mill was not being run as a cooperative, meetings were not being held, and 
members were not informed of the financial status of the mill. Some accused the mill 
management of being “caciques.”  
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Holzner (2006) and Olvera (2010) explain that clientelist organizations and practices 
remain resilient in Mexico despite an upsurge of resistance movements that demanded autonomy 
and democratic participation (see also Fox, 1994; Hellman, 2008). Olvera stresses the 
importance of examining state-society relationships. Mexico’s transition to democracy has been 
short-circuited by failure to propose effective democratic reforms and political projects. With the 
decentering of PRI, PAN reproduced PRI’s clientelistic politics, and the PRD followed suit. 
Where oppositional politics is marginalized, actors seek state resources, thus replicating reliance 
on a paternalistic, authoritarian benefactor. This phenomenon is mirrored in social movements 
where struggles for democratization likewise culminate in clientelism (Olvera 2010). As the 
PRD gained a stronger foothold in Michoacán,4 social movement leaders sought out their 
financial and political support. In return for tanks of petroleum, funding to pay workers during 
shortfalls and to supply fertilizer to cañeros, the PRD enhanced its electoral support during 
election campaigns. Social movement participants often adhere to clientelism as neoliberal 
reforms weaken the state patronage system of doling out jobs and social benefits.  
For Holzner the explanation for this phenomenon lies in a distinction between weak and 
strong organizational networks. Movements with weak ties tend to establish linkages with 
diverse groups across a broad region and thus promote information flows and synergy of the 
movement. Weak networks, by building coalitions, receive support from national and 
international solidarity groups that strengthens them. The MST, one of the most successful social 
movements in Latin America, accomplished this by establishing alliances with transnational 
support networks, such as churches and charity organizations. In other words, they scale up their 
organization by creating links to external organizations that provide additional support. These 
bring international condemnation for social rights abuses. Weak networks expose members to 
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new innovative ideas through information flows from outside. When grassroots organizations 
reach beyond clientelistic networks and create bridges with other organizations, “…participation 
in extensive networks…allows the poor to tap into multiple sources of information about 
resources, repertoires, and political opportunities” (Holzner 2006: 92). Weak ties provide bridges 
between social groups and thus establish inter-group connections that foster broader integration. 
The national-level protest across the country in 2001, indeed, created a coordinated effort among 
cañeros in 15 Mexican states, whose coordinated protest against lack of payment for delivered 
cane moved the government to expropriate 27 of the privatized sugar mills.  
Unlike the shift toward virtual communities and privatization of social life suggested by 
Wellman (1999) for Euro-based communities with weak networks, in Puruarán, social life retains 
dense networks of people connected through a common workplace, with the primary source of 
external networking expressed through outmigration. The glocalized, networked individualism 
Wellman (2002) describes is rare in the research community. The movement that formed in 1993 
brought in the state-level teachers’ syndicate that provided a leadership model and synergy to the 
movement. The movement also garnered some external support through journalists that 
strengthened their demands in its early phase. As the movement shifted power structures in 
subsequent phases, this extensive network contracted and became more reliant on clusters of 
dense networks with fewer relationships among members with outside supporters. Strong, dense 
networks build cohesion within local groups, but create intra-community clusters made up of 
factions that compete for leadership, rather than seeking common goals. Wellman (2002) makes 
clear that dense networks facilitate control of leaders over members’ behavior and also inhibit 
information flows from outside. This became a primary factor for inhibiting a stronger coalition 
with other communities to protest mill closings among the seven closed mills in western Mexico.  
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For those with strong networks, leaders tend to promote close ties with members, gain 
inordinate personal power through control of members’ activities, limit the flow of information, 
and isolate the movement from networking with other organizations. As leaders mobilize 
members into action through sit-ins, marches, and demonstrations, they develop collective 
consciousness and loyalty as they establish legitimacy of the movement. Strategies also include 
soliciting government support, use of ideological tools of persuasion, and outright repression. In 
Puruarán, the committee headed by the priest came to rely on PRI-based clientelism, as did those 
in the Oaxacan squatter movement reported by Holzner (2006). Negotiations with government 
officials were carried out by leaders who promised future rewards (reopening of the mill and new 
microenterprises to provide employment) to loyal followers who depended on continued 
paternalism. The social network became further constrained with the even stronger network 
created by leaders of the cooperative.  
Strong networks prevail where disappearing social services and economic insecurity 
exacerbate the need for resources. These leaders may be acting within the constraints of 
established structural inequalities, even at the expense of the cooperative’s members (Holzner, 
2006). In the case of the cooperative, the initial promise of a return to work and payments for 
cane provided support among members. Leaders in this case control access to information and 
may limit or distort information flows to conceal corruption. Soto’s excuse that the 1998 harvest 
was only a test, with promise of a brighter future, and blaming mill failures on sabotage 
exemplified this process. Likewise, after receiving income from the sale of sugar and syrup, not 
even the cooperative treasurer had knowledge of the amount earned, explaining to me: “As 
treasurer, I am responsible for managing finances, but they don’t let me because the president 
manages everything. I don’t know, professor, the income or value of the sale of that syrup 
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because the president of the Administration makes those negotiations directly.”  Even so, 
cultivation of strong ties assured the treasurer’s loyalty and unwillingness to challenge 
undemocratic practices he disagreed with: “In reality, those of us in the administration lack 
conscience for valuing what a cooperative is and to not be subject to the customs we were 
accustomed to under the yoke of the boss [of the privatized mill]. Well I am willing to avoid 
frictions with others of the administration because these confrontations among compañeros are 
not convenient.” Although he did not participate in the committees of Guzmán or the priest, his 
tight relationship with Soto depended on part in his faith that the mill would eventually bring 
profits.         
The cooperative president, for example, constrained information by failure to hold 
meetings or inform members of the financial status of the mill. His ability to do so shielded him 
from accusations of pilfering funds. Moreover, he distorted information flows by attributing mill 
failures to sabotage. The tight personal relationships with members allowed careful observation 
of behavior and he exerted control by expelling those who appeared disloyal. His access to 
resources provided from relationships established with PRD politicians (donations of petroleum 
and cash) fostered perceptions regarding his effectiveness as leader. Retaining monopoly control 
over resources provided the power to coerce and control by distributing rewards or sanctioning 
behavior. Members continued to depend on employment and cane payments available only 
through the cooperative. The administrative council of the cooperative also employed rhetoric 
intended to ensure conformity among members. At one of the rare meetings in 2000, a council 
member pointed out the lack of consciousness among members who only wanted to take what 
they could from the mill; this would lead them to bankruptcy. The president then affirmed, “If 
we continue supporting this cooperative, we are in the future. This is important because in one or 
 21 
two more years, we will begin to see the benefits.”  This analysis takes some liberty with 
Holzner’s thesis of clientelist preferences for PRI organizations, yet the movement itself 
reincorporated practices of clientelism in the form of leadership control of cooperative members. 
In this case, no networks were forged with other closed mills, and the movement was little 
known outside its geographically isolated region.  
Activists in the social movement presented a façade of collective identity as they 
premised the seizure of the sugar mill on cultural meanings of social justice and common good. 
They challenged, as Escobar and Alvarez would claim, “the state’s economic and political 
models and called into question authoritarian and hierarchical ways of doing politics” (1992: 2). 
From its inception, fissures surfaced and threatened disunity. The articulation of collective 
politics as a strategy for managing an illegally seized factory redounded in clientelism and 
caciquismo (bossism). 
Conclusions 
Puruarán is a community whose source of employment met its demise under the 
neoliberalizing policies of privatization and free-market globalization. People in Puruarán 
mobilized to confront their marginalization and the crisis of reproduction affecting family and 
community forms of survival. The community repossessed the closed sugar mill, claiming 
rightful ownership and demanding social justice even as they initiated power struggles for 
leadership among contending local factions. By creating the symbolism of the sugar mill as 
community patrimony, the community united in a common cause; torn by traditional patterns of 
caciquismo and clientelism, the community fractured again and again. Paoli and da Silva Telles 
(1998) argue that a dialectic struggle for hegemony reveals the contradictions inherent in 
demands for public social rights on the one hand, and the market-motivated right to profit at 
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social expense on the other. Hence, I argue that this transformation in the global-local nexus of 
relations obliges us to examine the uneven nature of hegemony and power as it is constituted in 
local communities.  
Some would define the social movement in Puruarán as an utter failure. Some struggled 
for social well-being of the community and a future for upcoming generations; others sought 
personal gain or political offices.  Not only did the Puruarán movement fracture into opposing 
factions, but Puruarán’s geographic marginality, lack of communication and interaction with a 
half-dozen other closed mills dispersed around the country, and dearth of media coverage limited 
participants’ ability to forge non-hierarchical relationships based on solidarity identity. As 
Holzner (2006), Olvera (2010) and others have shown, strong networks like those that prevail in 
Puruarán close off social movements to synergies derived from other movements and supportive 
networks. Those networks that did lend support tended to derive from political parties whose 
candidates sought electoral votes in exchange for monetary and legal support. The traditional 
PRI clientelism became manifest as well in the PRD which maintains a stronghold in Michoacán. 
These dynamics were clear as the social movement transformed through three distinct phases: 
the initial effort to illegally seize the mill, the mediating force of the priest’s committee, and the 
formation of the cooperative that ultimately failed. 
What, then, is the significance of a failed social movement?  Paoli and da Silva Telles go 
to the heart of my argument: 
 It is not that social movements are, in themselves, intrinsically virtuous. Rather, social 
movements are important because they constitute, in the conflictive terrain of social life, 
public arenas in which conflicts gain visibility and collective actors become valid 
spokespersons. In these arenas, rights structure a public language that delimits the criteria 
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through which collective demands are problematized and evaluated in their exigency of 
equity and justice. This language is the source of the processes that mobilize aspirations 
to redefine social power by tying together different meanings and practices…. [that] 
unsettle the dominant political culture by forcing it to confront other cultures and politics 
(1998: 66). 
  Certainly, the mill owner and the state government were forced to recognize the strategies 
and demands of participants, however transient their empowerment. For nine years they 
accomplished their goal of reopening their source of employment.  Regardless of competing 
factions and divergent strategies for realizing their goals, all groups in Puruarán sought 
reopening of the sugar mill. Regrettably, other lessons may be gleaned from these 18 years of 
struggle. We may find glory in grassroots struggles for democratization and social justice, but 
more attention must be lent to the internal dynamics of social movements and their failures as 
well as their successes.  Cooperativism and unity of purpose can succeed only through flexible, 
loose networks of individuals who privilege consensus decision making and transparency in 
management. Even more importantly, the Puruarán social movement lays bare misguided state 
policies that favor capitalist accumulation over social responsibility.   
Furthermore, the structures of transnational capital accumulation and growing 
impoverishment provide fertile ground for drug cartels whose murderous competition with local 
economies turns alternative struggles—as it did this one—into battlegrounds. 
Without the economic hub of the community, production and trafficking in drugs provided one 
of the few opportunities for economic survival.  As drug-related violence penetrates regions 
where poverty abounds, it further victimizes social movements’ efforts to seek alternative 
development strategies and social justice. Just as the struggle between Puruarenses and external 
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interests provides a dynamic that illustrates the way national and international influences shape 
local developments, likewise, the dramatic impact of the “war on drugs” realigned global and 
local contexts in the region. As Vulliamy (2011) points out, the drug war is the ultimate 
expression of capitalism gone mad as cartels specialize in predatory capitalism. While neoliberal 
globalization creates unfathomable gaps between rich and poor, escalation of the war on drugs 
resulted in the horrifying violence of the past few years as drug lords retaliate a misguided 
policy. The battles between agrarianism and neoliberalism, social rights and privatization, 
guaranteed markets and free trade, form an idiom of contested power, now superseded by narco 
mahem. Puruarán has become yet one battle field in this larger clash between two illogical 
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1 A popular song at the time, “El Barzón,” begins with the verse: “Those lands in the corner, I 
planted with the oxen working, the yoke’s hitch (barzón) broke, and the oxen continued 
working,” suggested that even when released from the yoke, the oxen were still oppressed. A 
later section continues: “My shameless boss took all my corn, for his own evil granary, the 
barzón broke, and the ox continued working.” 
2 An original copy of the letter was loaned by a relative of Timoteo LIanza. 
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3 The PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) formed in the aftermath of the Mexican 
revolution and held dominance from 1929-2000 (initially under several different names). 
As a corporatist state, both the national cane growers’ union and the national mill 
workers’ syndicate were organized as separate entities under auspices of PRI. These 
sectors were both controlled by party politics through suppression of strikes and 
dissidence, and also accorded benefits (workers’ rights, guaranteed wages, social 
security, etc.) by the clientelist state (see also Olvera 2010). PAN, the conservative 
National Action Party, was founded in 1939, and managed to displace PRI in the 
national election of 2000. It won again in the highly contested election against the PRD 
in 2006. The leftist PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) formed in 1989 as a 
socialist-democratic opposition to PRI and has been particularly strong in Michoacán. 
Since the demise of PRI, the cane growers’ unions and mill workers’ syndicates have 
lost their traditional linkage to PRI and have suffered internal divisions at the national 
level. 
4 From 1980-86 Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, founder of the PRD, served as state governor. 
Two other PRD governors served, Lázaro Cárdenas Batel (2002–2008), and Leonel 
Godoy (2008–2012).  
